The approach to temporal reasoning which has proven most popular in AI is the rei ed approach. In this approach, one introduces names for events and states and uses special predicates to assert that an event or state occurs or holds at a particular time. However, recently the rei ed approach has come under attack, both on technical and on ontological grounds. Thus, it has been claimed that at least some rei ed temporal logics do not give one more expressive power than provided by alternative approaches. Moreover, it has been argued that the rei cation of event and state types in rei ed temporal logics, rather than event and state tokens, makes the ontology more complicated than necessary.
Introduction
Reasoning about time and change is of great importance in Arti cial Intelligence (for an overview, see Vila (in press)). For example, in order to behave intelligently, an agent needs to be able to plan its actions, and in order to do so, it needs to be able to reason about the consequences of its actions. This in turn requires that the agent can foresee the changes that its actions bring about in the world. Given the advantages that logic has for knowledge representation (see Reichgelt, 1991 , ch 3, for an overview), it seems natural to try to model this type of reasoning in temporal logic.
Classical logics disregard the temporal dimension when it comes to assigning truth values to propositions. Propositions are assigned a truth value once and for all, and this truth value is not assumed to change over time. Temporal Logics have been designed speci cally to formalize the notion of time. Statements are no longer timelessly true or false but true or false at a certain time.
Logicians have explored two main approaches to formulating temporal logics.
The rst approach, which, following Haugh (1987) , we will call the method of temporal arguments (MTA), simply includes time as an additional argument in the predicate and function symbols 1 . Thus, whereas normally dances would be a 2-place predicate, in MTA dances would become a 3-or 4-place predicate, where the additional arguments might be the time at which the original proposition was true, or the point at which the proposition starts to be true and the point at which the proposition ceases to be true. Often, in order to accord a special status to time and to improve the e ciency of the theorem prover, it is convenient to move to a many-sorted logic whose sorts include the sort of normal individuals and the sort of time points (or intervals).
One then normally also de nes a set of temporal ordering predicates to be able to do temporal reasoning.
An alternative way to incorporate time is by complicating the model theory. This is the Modal Temporal approach. Using a Kripke-style possible world approach, the di erent times become di erent possible worlds, while the accessibility relationship becomes a temporal ordering relationship. Di erent modal temporal logics are obtained by imposing di erent properties on this relationship. A formula is true with respect to a particular time t. In order to make the syntax re ect the more complicated semantics, one needs to introduce a number of modal operators. Traditionally, these include F (\at some future time"), P (\at some past time"), G (\at any future time") and H (\at any past time"). However, for most AI applications, these operators are not su cient, and one usually needs to introduce further modal operators (see, e.g., Reichgelt (1989) who introduces an AT operator scheme, or Fischer (1991) who introduces a whole range of additional modal operators).
Both approaches have their own pros and cons (see Reichgelt, 1989 , for an overview). For example, the Method of Temporal Arguments has the advantage that it is a standard rst-order logic, and one can therefore make use of standard theorem proving techniques. This is clearly not the case for modal temporal logic. On the other hand, modal temporal logic seems more expressive and allows one for example to express propositions with repeated temporal expressions, such as \Jordi will have danced with Iolanda". However, neither approach allows one to quantify over propositions. As a result, it is not possible to express what in the remainder of this paper we will call general temporal knowledge. Examples of general temporal knowledge include \e ects never precede their causes", or \incompatible states do not temporally overlap".
It is for reasons like these that a third approach has gained wide acceptance in Arti cial Intelligence. Shoham (1986) calls this approach the rei ed approach. In rei ed temporal logic, one rei es propositions and introduces names for them. One then uses predicates such HOLDS or OCCURS to indicate that the proposition named is true at a certain time, or over a certain interval. Examples of this approach are McDermott (1982) , Allen (1984) , Kowalski and Sergot (1986) , Dean and McDermott (1986) , Shoham (1986 Shoham ( , 1987 and Reichgelt (1989) . The latter two attempt to give a precise model-theoretic semantics for rei ed temporal logics.
Although rei ed have proven very popular, recently they have come under attack. Galton (1991), for example, considers them \philosophically suspect and technically unnecessary". Our aim in this paper is to show that one can avoid the philosophical problems that Galton objects to, while giving one the desired expressive power. The outline of the paper is as follows. In section 2, we brie y review the di erent rei ed logics. In section 3, we discuss the objections that have been raised against rei ed temporal logics. In section 4, we propose our rei ed temporal logic which avoid the objections. Section 5 concludes.
Rei ed Temporal Logics
The most straightforward way to de ne a rei ed temporal logic is as a sorted logic. There are three main types, namely individuals, temporal elements, i.e., points in time or intervals, and temporal entities, i.e. states or events that are true at particular points in time or over intervals of time. It is these temporal entities that give rei ed logic its rei ed nature. As Shoham (1986 Shoham ( , 1987 observes, typically, temporal entities correspond to propositions in a non-temporal rst-order logic.
One can generate a rei ed temporal language RTL from a standard a-temporal rst-order language LInt by (i) introducing names of sort temporal entity in RTL for the propositions in LInt, (ii) introducing a new sort temporal element, and (iii) introducing a number of what in the remainder of the paper we will call temporal occurrence predicates, such as HOLDS and OCCURS which link the proposition names with particular times.
RTL names for LInt propositions can be generated as follows. Each function symbol or constant in LInt is also a function symbol or constant in RTL. In the case of a function symbol, all its arguments are individuals, while its value is an individual as well. The sort of the RTL constant is an individual too. Each n-place predicate symbol in LInt becomes an n-place function symbol in RTL whose arguments are all individuals, but whose value is a temporal entity. Thus, a 2-place LInt predicate like dances becomes a 2-place function symbol in RTL.
Di erent temporal elements can be taken as primitive. For example, Allen's rei ed logic uses intervals as its only temporal elements, whereas both McDermott and Shoham use points. Thus, there are di erences between rei ed temporal logics because the nature of the time primitive.
However, for the purposes of our present discussion, such di erences are irrelevant.
Each rei ed temporal logic is also characterized by its temporal occurrence predicates. Di erent rei ed temporal logics make di erent choices. However, typically they include predicates such as HOLDS to indicate that some state is true during some period, and OCCURS to indicate that some event occurs over some period. Galton (1990) makes a further diversi cation of these predicates depending on whether the state or event is said to be true at an instant, on a period or in a period. On the other hand, if an event occurs over an interval, it does not occur over any subinterval. Shoham (1986) gives a more exhaustive classi cation of temporal entities.
Part of the attraction of rei ed temporal logics is that they allow one to quantify over propo- The researchers who originally introduced rei ed temporal logic did not de ne an explicit model-theoretic semantics for their systems. Shoham (1986 Shoham ( , 1987 attempts to rectify this situation. Shoham observes that in Allen's logic in particular, the rst argument to the HOLDS predicate looks very much like a proposition in propositional calculus. Thus, Allen wants to be able to say things like: HOLDS(dances(Jordi; Iolanda)^tired(Pedro); i)
Shoham then suggests that the rei ed temporal logics look very much like formalizations of the model theory of modal temporal logic with HOLDS corresponding to j=, and Shoham suggests that a semantics for rei ed temporal logic should be built on the basis of this observation. Because Shoham's work has been a reference for subsequent work, it is worth to discuss it in a little more detail. We will argue that Shoham's logic is not a truly rei ed temporal logic, and that, as a result, some of the objections that have been raised against Shoham's logic, do not apply to rei ed temporal logic in general.
Shoham's logic is a two-sorted logic, with as its only sorts times and individuals. Apart from the normal recursive rules for constructing well-formed formulas, Shoham includes two rules for generating atomic well-formed formulas. The rst states that, if t 1 and t 2 are temporal terms, i.e. terms referring to individuals of sort time, then t 1 = t 2 and t 1 t 2 are well-formed formulas.
The second rule gives the following de nition of an atomic formula: if t 1 abd t 2 are temporal terms,i 1 . . .i n are non-temporal terms (terms referring to individuals), r is an n-place relation symbol, then TRUE(t 1 ; t 2 ; r(i 1 ; . . .; i n )) is a well-formed formula. Thus, something like is true if the pair consisting of the individuals denoted by the constants jordi and iolanda is a member of the 2-place relation denoted by the 2-place predicate symbol dances at the times t 1 and t 2 .
As pointed out in Reichgelt (1989) , although very interesting, Shoham's logic is not a fully rei ed temporal logic. Although Shoham rei es times, and allows for constants in the language to refer to points in time, and variables to quantify over them, the third argument to TRUE is not an expression one can quantify over. As we noted above, Shoham calls dances a relation symbol, rather than a function symbol. As a result, the subexpression dances(Jordi; Iolanda) does not denote an individual, and hence cannot be quanti ed over. In fact, TRUE is perhaps best An alternative way of making the same point is the following. Although Shoham points out that one of the attraction of rei ed temporal logic is that it allows one to express general temporal knowledge, ironically, such statements cannot be expressed in Shoham's logic. Shoham's logic does not allow for quanti cation over the third argument of TRUE.
The hybrid nature of Shoham's logic also explains some of the other criticisms in the literature.
For example, Bacchus, Tenenberg and Koomen (1991) point to the lack of a proof theory for Shoham's logic. They use this to argue in favour of a non-rei ed temporal logic, which is very much in the spirit of Haugh's method of temporal arguments. While we believe that Bacchus et al are correct in criticising Shoham's logic for its lack of a proof theory, it seems to us that they mis-diagnose the reason behind this problem: It is not the rei ed nature of Shoham's logic that is to blame; it is the fact that the logic is in fact a modal logic and not fully rei ed.
In order to overcome some of the problems associated with Shoham's logic, Reichgelt (1989) de nes a fully rei ed temporal logic. Reichgelt takes as his starting point Shoham's observation that the temporal entities used in the rei ed logics of Allen and McDermott are very similar to propositions. He then formalises, in rst-order logic, the semantics of a modal temporal logic which is identical to standard modal temporal logic, except for the introduction of an AT-operator scheme which allows one to construct modal operators to refer to speci c points in time. Although the resulting system is fully rei ed, and moreover is a sorted rst-order logic, it is rather baroque in nature. For example, Reichgelt needs to introduce both constants referring to actual individuals, as well as constants referring to names for individuals. He then also needs a predicate to express that some name refers to some individual. While the resulting system allows one to use a theorem prover for rst-order logic, its complicated nature makes it extremely unlikely that such a theorem prover would achieve acceptable e ciency. Moreover, representing information in the logic is non-trivial. 3 Objections to rei ed temporal logic While rei ed temporal logics have enjoyed considerable popularity, recently they have come under attack. A number of authors have argued that rei ed temporal logics are unnecessarily complicated is possible to regard it as a second-order logic with dances as a rst-order predicate and TRUE as a second-order predicate. However, since Shoham explicitly states that he wants his logic to be rst-order, this interpretation would seem to run counter to Shoham's intentions. and force one to accept a philosophically suspect ontology. In this section, we review the criticisms.
BTK unrei cation
A rst piece of work that we want to discuss here is the system of Bacchus, Tenenberg and Koomen (1991 They claim, rightly in our opinion, that translating into BTK has the advantage that one can now use a theorem prover for many-sorted rst-order logics to reason about temporal information, something which is not possible in Shoham's system 5 .
Nevertheless, as we pointed out above, Shoham's one is not a fully rei ed temporal logic. As Bacchus et al point out themselves, BTK has some expressive limitations compared to a real rei ed logic, such as Allen's, in that one is not able to quantify over propositions. As a result, pieces of general temporal knowledge cannot be expressed in BTK.
Galton's unrei cation
Galton (1991) proposes a di erent method of unrei cation. His proposal is based on the idea of incorporating state and event tokens. It is an attempt to keep some of the increased expressive power that rei ed logics provide while avoiding the complications inherent in rei cation. His argument is also partly ontological. Galton argues that the rei ed logics force one to reify event 4 The main innovation in BTK over MTA, is that each predicate and function symbol can take any number of temporal arguments. 5 It is perhaps worthwhile to point out that it is not in general possible to translate a modal temporal logic into a logic such as BTK, at least not if one is not willing to accept quanti cation over non-existing individuals. Thus, Reichgelt (1989) points that a naive translation of the modal propositions P (9x)(p(x)) and (9x)(Pp(x)) as (9t)(9x)(t < now^p(x; t)) and (9x)(9x)(t < now^p(x; t)) respectively, would not be acceptable for a temporal logic with a variable domain of individuals. After all, in such a logic, the original modal propositions would not be equivalent, whereas their non-modal translations would be. It is of course possible to introduce an existence predicate into the non-modal language, but this would have the ontologically unacceptable consequence that existence becomes a property of individuals.
types. Thus, Allen's HOLDS or OCCURS predicate de nes a relationship between an interval and a state or event type respectively. Taking his lead from Davidson (1967) , and following a long tradition in ontology, Galton argues that a logic which forces one to reify event tokens instead of event types, would be preferable on ontological grounds. Using Occam's razor, Galton argues that one should not multiply the entities in one's ontology without need, and that, unless one is a die-hard Platonist, one would prefer an ontology based on particulars rather than universals.
On the other hand, Galton is sympathetic to the aim of staying within rst-order logic, and he explicitly rejects Shoham's logic because it is modal. In summary, Galton's aim is to de ne a logic without philosophically dubious rei cation while staying inside the bounds of classical predicate logic.
In order to achieve his aims, Galton uses the notion of token. A token basically is the occurrence of some either event of state at some point in time. For instance, \Jordi dancing with Iolanda at 3.00pm" is an event token. On the one hand, tokens act as additional parameters to predicate and function symbols, as in the method of temporal arguments, while on the other also being used in the temporal occurrence predicates. Thus, something like HOLDS(dances(Jordi; Iolanda); i) in Allen's logic, becomes (9e)(TRUE(i; e)^dances(Jordi; Iolanda; e)) Because Galton introduces tokens, he clearly avoids the philosophically dubious rei cation of types. Also, his system is a sorted rst-order logic with as sorts times, event tokens, state tokens and individuals.
However, although we believe the introduction of the notion of tokens to be appropriate, the way in which Galton introduces them would seem to lead to problems. For example, it is not clear how Galton represents causal relations. Galton, in our view correctly, proposes to regard causality as a relationship between tokens, and he introduces a predicate ECAUSE(e 1 ; e 2 ), which he de nes Unfortunately, it seems to us that this proposal is problematic. After all, E and E 0 are not primitive predicates in the language. Instead, they need to be regarded as lambda expressions of the form (x)(dances(Jordi; Iolanda; x)) But, it is not clear to us how one can determine the identity of the lambda expression given that all that one has is the name of the event token. Therefore, the proposed formula can at best be treated as a formula schema, and as such cannot be part of the logic. For every causal relationship that one wants to talk about in a particular theory, one would have to nd an instantiation of the predicates E and E 0 , and it is in this sense that we contend that the above formula schema does not directly express any general temporal knowledge about causality.
Another problem is that nothing in Galton's formulation prevents the same event token from occurring at more than one time. Thus, something like Although we nd Galton's proposal to introduce tokens attractive, we believe that the primary problem with Galton's approach arise from the way in which he introduces tokens. By regarding names for tokens as primitive entities, one loses certain information about the token. The resulting logic, although rst-order and not reifying event types, does not, it seems to us, allow for a completely satisfactory representation of causality and general temporal knowledge. In the next subsection, we will provide additional arguments for the need to have tokens in one's ontology.
We will then propose a token-based approach based on the idea of having`meaningful' names for tokens.
The need for tokens
Before we present our logic, we give a few additional arguments for the need to include event and state tokens in the ontology. In the previous subsection, we saw that Galton objected to including event and state types on ontological grounds. However, there are some further arguments which concern the expressive power of the language.
A rei ed temporal logic which is based on \pure types", i.e. one which does not have any tokens, su ers from a number of expressive limitations, in particular when it comes to expressing causality. In such a logic, causal relations have to be regarded as involving event types. However, this leads to problems when one wants to express what one might call \one-o " causal relations, such as \the rain of the 22th caused the landslide on the 23th". Clearly, in order to express represent this, one requires a way to refer to particular occurrences of a type. Similar problems arise when it comes to expressing multiple causes. such as \the rain of the 22th caused three di erent landslides". If the landslides have the same features and are di erentiated only by the time they occur, then they will be represented by the same type. In other words, unless one has tokens in the language, one cannot di erentiate between them. In this context, Haugh (1987) talks about the \individuation and counting of the events of a particular type". One cannot, for instance, refer to the set of e ects caused by the rain of the 22th. Also, one cannot quantify over causes and the related set of the e ects each produces in order to assert general constraints between them.
It is interesting to note that Allen, whose logic is based on event and state types, implicitly seems to recognise the need for event tokens (as also pointed out by Galton 
The Token-Rei ed Temporal Logic
We have seen that many of the rei ed logics are not entirely satisfactory. For example, Shoham's logic is only partially rei ed with the consequences that the logic is not expressive enough and that the question of how to implement a theorem prover for it remains open. In Allen's rei ed approach, the rei cation of types provides higher expressive power, but it is achieved through the use of \implicit tokens". Moreover, types are objectionable on ontological grounds. We have seen, on the other hand, that none of the attempts to unreify temporal logic give one the required expressive power. In this section, we present a new rei ed temporal logic TRL (Token-Rei ed Logic), which we believe o ers the best of all worlds. TRL is more natural and elegant than
Galton's logic. Moreover, unlike Shoham's logic, TRL is non-modal and therefore allows one to use a standard theorem prover. Finally, unlike Allen's system, TRL achieves all this without reifying event types.
The primary intuition behind TRL is that we would like to reify event tokens, rather than event types. However, rather than making names for event tokens an additional argument to a predicate, we propose to introduce \meaningful" names for event tokens. This allows us to express statements about all event tokens that meet some condition.
Technically, TRL keeps the temporal occurrence predicates, such as HOLDS and OCCURS 6 , but makes them 1-place. Their only argument then is the name for an state-or event-token.
Moreover, rather than making a n-place predicate symbol into an n + 1 or n + m place predicate symbol, as Galton and Bacchus et al respectively do, we make them into an n + 2 place function symbol. When applied to n individuals and 2 points in time, the function returns a state or an event token. The predicate HOLDS or OCCURS then simply states that this state token indeed holds, or that this event token indeed occurred. Because we now have \meaningful" names for state-and event tokens, we can quantify over \parts of an event token". This allows us to have our cake and eat it: While our ontology is as simple as Galton's in that we only allow for individuals, times, and event tokens, quanti cation allows us to express general temporal knowledge.
We rst present the syntax of TRL before we brie y give the semantics. We then illustrate the expressive power of our logic.
The logical language TRL we use is that of a sorted rst-order logic. We use the following sorts:
I, individuals T, time S, state tokens E, event tokens
Each constant, predicate symbol or function symbol has of course a sortal signature associated with it. In general, the signatures can be generated automatically from an initial, non-temporal language LInt. For example, each n-place predicate symbol in LInt becomes an n + 2-place function symbol in L with its rst n arguments being of type I, its last two arguments being of type T, and its output being either of type S or type E.
TRL contains, amongst others, the following 1-place predicates:
HOLDS, with an argument of type S OCCURS, with an argument of type E TRL also contains the 2-place predicate < whose arguments are both of type T.
We also introduce the following two 1-place function symbols, whose input argument is of type S or E and whose output argument is of type T, namely BEGIN First, one of the di erences between states and events is that if a state is true over an interval i, it is also true over all sub-intervals of i. In the case of events, if an event is true over an interval i, then it is false over all sub-intervals of i. We need to ensure that our model theory does indeed enforce this. Thus, we have the following conditions: Although any axiomization of our logic will have to include the above formulas, as well as obviously the axioms for classical rst-order predicate calculus, we have, as yet, not established whether this set of axioms is complete.
We demonstrate our language by simply giving a number of statements. Note that we introduce two predicates for causation. We are forced to do so because our logic is sorted and an event can cause both another event and a state. The predicate ECAUSE is used to denote a causal relationship between two events, while the predicate CAUSE is used to denote a causal relationship between an event and a state. Some of the above statements need some additional comments. First, statement 7 may seem to be a rather weak statement in that it merely states that the beginning of the cause must precede the beginning of the caused event. However, any attempt to strengthen this statement will lead to problems. For example, one obvious way to strengthen the statement would be to insist that the end of the cause precedes either the beginning of the caused event or its end. However, in a statement like \the heavy rainfalls caused a landslide", there is no suggestion that the rains nished before the landslide started, or before it ended. Similarly, strengthening the statement to say that the end of the cause coincides with the start of the caused event leads to problems.
Consider for example the statement \Setting the alarm at 7.00 pm to go o at 7.00 am caused it to go o in the morning".
Second, statement 8 may seem to be problematic. The statement is intended to say that Jordi being happy is incompatible with Jordi being tired. Incompatibility would seem to be more naturally regarded as a relationship between event types rather than event tokens, and statement 8 demonstrates the superior expressive power of our logic in that it allows us to formulate relationships which intuitively would seem to be relationships between types without having to admit types in our ontology. Note incidentally that the statement should not be read as saying that
Jordi being happy at any time is incompatible with him being tired at any other time. Knowledge about incompatibility is split between a speci c statement stating that two events are incompatible (statement 8), and the general temporal patterns (statement 9). It is easy to ascertain that 8. The separation between the speci c statement and the general pattern allows for a more modular representation of temporal knowledge.
One could only express the rst three statements in BTK. Galton's logic also allows for the expression of these statements. Statement 4 could be correctly expressed in his logic as 7 :
(8e : E; t; t We believe that these statements demonstrate the superiority of our logic. Although all statements can be expressed in Galton's logic, we believe that especially statement 4 shows the bene ts of having meaningful names for event tokens. It allows us to construct expressions using tokens, quantifying over them and picking out parts of them like their times and types. Since the information concerning a certain token is gathered in a single term, our logic gives a more natural and concise way of expressing temporal information. For example, since the name for a token includes the time at which the token occurs or holds, there is no need for an axiom to ensure that each token occurs or holds at only one time.
Concluding remarks
In this paper, we presented a new rei ed temporal logic that maintains the expressive advantages of rei ed logic, stays within the bounds of rst-order logic, and does not force one to accept ontologically suspect types of individuals. The main innovation is that we do not make the nplace predicate symbol in an initial non-rei ed non-temporal language into an n + 1 or n + 2 place predicate symbol, as one would do in the method of temporal arguments, or into an n-place function symbol as one might do in Allen's rei ed temporal logic. Instead, we turn it into an n+2 place function symbol. The denotation of this symbol is a function from the set of individuals and the set of points in time into the set of state or event tokens. We thus get meaningful names for such tokens, and we can quantify over parts of these names. It is this latter feature which gives us the expressive power that we need, without forcing us into accepting the ontologically suspect state or event types.
